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Abstract 
Attractiveness of fiscal regime has become more important in oil and gas investment decision than the rather geological 
prospectivity of the province. The terms and conditions contained in the fiscal system influence the investor’s evaluation of 
project. As Ghana determines to benefit greatly from the exploitation of the oil and gas resources, a robust fiscal system 
attractive in all economical and technical conditions needs to be designed. Ghana has recently become one of the frontiers in 
the oil and gas industry following its commercial discoveries of hydrocarbons in Deepwater Tano-Cape Three Point, the Jubilee 
field. Ghana’s oil industry is very young and some of the basins are under exploration surveillances waiting for commercial 
discoveries. Ghana’s Jubilee field uses various terms and conditions in her fiscal arrangement to govern the upstream 
operations. For continuous realisation of economic benefits to the State as well as the contractor, it is important the applicability 
of Ghana’s fiscal regime at varying boundary conditions of oil price and field reserves are evaluated. Discounted cash flow 
economic model which considers the major uncertainties was developed to evaluate the economic implications of the Jubilee 
field fiscal regime. Different price scenarios and varying field sizes were taken through rigorous sensitivity analysis. It was 
determined that for all field sizes considered at oil prices above $ 40/bbl, contractor’s NPVs are positive. The project take 
statistics are averagely around 64% for Government and 36% for contractor under the various scenarios except for oil prices 
less than $40/bbl where the State’s take statistic is above 80% and contractor’s take below 20%. The State receives Additional 
Oil Entitlement(AOE) only when the oil price is above $40/bbl and the AOE increases steadily with the oil price for all the 
various field sizes. In general, the Jubilee field fiscal regime is fairly attractive and flexible and ensures stable shares of 
economic rents between the State and the contractor as the profitability of the field increases. 
 




There are different types of fisal systems ((Iledare, 
2004; Karasalihovic-Seldar et al., 2017), and 
whether simple or sophisticated, a fiscal system 
should address the expected boundary conditions of 
oil and gas project under consideration. A fiscal 
system becomes less efficient if it either gives more 
to the contractor at the expense of the host 
government (HG) or vice versa (Mian, 2010).  
Therefore, impact of fiscal variables on the end 
result of the fiscal system must be sufficiently 
scrutinised during its formulation (Johnston, 2010). 
Fiscal systems that are progressive finds a focus for 
both government and the contractor by optimising 
effort and benefits (Onwuka et al., 2012). The 
structure and conduct of the global Exporation and 
Production (E&P) industry have changed 
significantly in recent years to the extent that the 
search for and development of petroleum resources 
have become mostly driven by the attractiveness of 
the fiscal regimes rather than geological 
prospectivity only (Echendu et al., 2012). The 
petroleum fiscal system contains the terms and 
conditions which constitute an important factor that 
influences investor’s project evaluation (Onwuka et 
al., 2012). Oil and gas markets are becoming more 
competitive and many diverging interests are 
emerging, therefore, an attractive and efficient fiscal 
system for oil and gas exploration and production is 
paramount. Even though many of the variables that 
affect the profitability of a petroleum project are 
beyond the control of both the host government and 
the investing companies, the host government can 
take actions to minimise uncertainty. Project 
uncertainty correlates directly with the cost of the 
investment. Thus, reducing uncertainty results in a 
reduction of the cost of capital, which in turn 
increases the rent potentially available for 
government’s taxation (Tordo et al., 2009).  
 
Ghana has recently become one of the fontiers in the 
oil and gas industry in West Africa following her 
major commercial discovery of hydrocarbons in 
Deepwater Tano-Cape Three Point, the Jubilee field. 
Ghana’s oil industry is very young, and some of the 
basins are under exploration surveillances for 
possible commercial discoveries. Thus, there is no 
doubt that the presence of petroleum in commercial 
quantities should have important economic, 
developmental, and strategic consequences for 
Ghana. These offshore Cape Three Point discoveries 
are gift of nature but they require investment and 
effort to translate the resource into saleable crude oil 
before the government can realise the hydrocarbon 
revenues. In other words, Ghana as a state has the 
sovereign jurisdiction over these subsurface 
resources and responsibility to maintain an attractive 
and efficient fiscal system to generate maximum 
economic benefits. Adequate fiscal regime flexible 
will make Ghana to have competitive advantage for 
influx of foreign investments over her counterparts 
in the region (Tordo et al., 2009). Adopting a 
particular fiscal regime is a choice that depends on 
many factors and according to Iledare (2010) and 
Johnston (2010), two fiscal systems may have the 
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same overall tax burden, but their relative 
effectiveness, efficiency and impact on investment 
decisions may differ significantly. The 
attractiveness of fiscal contracts has a fundamental 
effect on profitability of any petroleum projects, and 
thus an important indicator for evaluating 
investment feasibility in the country (Li, 2016). To 
ensure greater long-term stability in the system, it 
should account for any future changes in oil prices 
(Ghebremusse, 2014). Moreover, the discovery of 
‘giant’ oil/gas fields is becoming rare recently. It is 
important that more attention is focused on 
developing “small” fields. The economic 
development of these small fields such as in Ghana 
requires flexible fiscal terms to provide high levels 
of government take in case of a profitable 
development and a reasonable rate of return to 
investors if the product prices are low (Mian, 2011).  
 
Ghana ‘s benefit from the exploitation of the oil and 
gas resources can only be realised through robust 
fiscal system which is designed to be attractive in all 
economical and technical conditions with regards to 
exploration and production of the hydrocarbons 
beneath Ghana’s soil. Ghana’s Jubilee field uses 
various terms and conditions in the fiscal 
arrangement to govern the upstream operations. For 
continuous realisation of economic benefits to the 
State as well as contractor, it is important the 
applicability of Ghana’s fiscal regime at varying 
boundary conditions of oil price and field reserves 
are evaluated.  
 
The questions being asked are the following: how 
robust are the current Ghana’s fiscal regime against 
the low or high oil price environment? and will 
Ghana continue to maximise resource rent from the 
deepwater fiscal regimes while still attracting 
investors to go ahead with the very high cost project 
even for small field sizes? Good economic outlooks 
of the current fiscal system as answers to these 
questions are important for government’s annual 
budget and development strategies and potential 
investors decisions. 
 
2 Resources and Methods Used 
 
The Ghana’s fiscal regime governing the offshore 
Cape Three Point was investigated to account for its 
applicability for varying boundary conditions such 
as field size and product prices. Different field 
reserves and oil prices were used to develop 
discounted cash flow model to investigate the 
various fiscal terms. The investigation was done to 
evaluate impact of the fiscal terms on the end 





2.1 Discounted Cash Flow Model Analysis 
 
Discounted cash flow model as a tool for project 
economic evaluation, consists of forecasting the 
production levels, estimating initial investments and 
the product potential price levels and generating 
revenues. Once the cash flow model has been built, 
the merit of any proposed fiscal terms can be 
evaluated based on certain economic indicators. 
These are discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1.1 Production Forecast 
 
In forecasting the production levels, initial build-up 
rate was considered during the development of the 
field. Peak production levels follow when the field 
is fully developed. How long the production stays at 
peak level depends on economic, technical as well 
as reservoir factors. Production levels will begin to 
decline eventually. Production forecasts of oil and 
gas wells aid in the economics of the project (Mian, 
2011). Figs. 1 to 3 show the production forecasts for 
the various field sizes considered. The decline 
portion of the forecasts considered exponential 
decline curve amongst various curves given by 
Arps. This is adopted because it is the conventional 
method applied by the oil and gas companies. 
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Fig. 3 Production Forecast for Oil Field of 200 
Mmbbl Reserves 
 
2.1.2 Petroleum Operation Cost Estimates 
 
The assumptions used to estimate the petroleum 
operation costs is listed in Table 1. The exploration 
and appraisal cost was obtained from Anon (2016). 
The cost estimates were maintained for all the field 
sizes and the various oil price levels of $ 20, 30, 40, 
50, 60,80, and 100 per barrel were used. 
 
2.2  Terms of the Cape Three Point Fiscal 
Regime 
 
2.2.1 Carried Interest and Additional Interest 
 
According to Anon (2000), the contractor has the 
responsibility of executing the petroleum operations 
of the contracted areas subject to the clause that 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) is 
able to execute appraisal activities of the contracted 
area after a discovery is declared. GNPC has initial 
interest of ten percent (10%) in all petroleum 
operations.With respect to all exploration and 
development operations, such interest is carried 
interest, thus GNPC does not pay any exploration 
and development costs. Contractor bears the entire 
cost of the operations. 
 
Table 1 Petroleum Costs Estimates 
(Source: Anon, 2016)  
However, for production operations the interest 
becomes a paid interest and GNPC pays for its 
proportionate share of development and production 
costs. GNPC has additional participating interest of 
3.64%, which means GNPC contributing 
proportionate share of 3.64% of all development and 
production costs (Anon, 2016). 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Income Tax 
 
Jubilee Petroleum Agreement gives 35% as the 
corporate income tax rate. The costs incurred during 
all petroleum operations are capitalised until 
production. At that time, costs may be recovered and 
used as deductions against petroleum revenue. 
These capital allowances come to play from the year 
of commercial production on petroleum capital 
expenditure, and it is at a rate of 20% on a straight 
line basis.  
 
2.2.3 Royalty Payments  
 
Jubilee contractors make royalty payable to the 
Government of Ghana through GNPC at a rate of 5% 
on gross revenue for all petroleum production. The 
royalties paid by the contractor are a tax deductible 
element in assessing tax liability. 
 
2.2.4 Additional Oil Entitlement (AOE) 
 
The Jubilee fiscal system makes provision for the 
government of Ghana through GNPC to have share 
or percentage in contractor’s share of remaining 
revenue as and when the contractor is making profit. 
This share is called the Additional Oil Entitlement 
(AOE) which seeks to measure Ghana’s entitlement 
to the crude oil and serves as an additional 
production tax. This share is based on the after-tax 
inflation – adjusted Rate of Return (ROR) that the 
Contractor achieved with respect to contracted area 
(Anon, 2000; Anon, 2016). The agreed rates of ROR 
that trigger new level of Additional Oil Entitlement 
is shown in Table 2. This provision enables the State 
to participate in profits in excess of the contractor’s 
expected risk adjusted rate of return (Akyeampong, 
2009). 
 
Table 2 Additional Oil Entitlement Basis 
ROR AOE Rate 
< 12.5% 0% 
12.5% 17.5% 10% 
17.5% 22.5% 12.5% 
22.5% 27.5% 20.0% 
27.5% 32.5% 25.0% 
> 32.5% 30% 
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2.2.5 Surface Rental and Training Obligations 
 
Contractors of Jubilee field make surface rental 
payments to the Government of Ghana for the use of 
government property, public lands, and they are 
required to make statutory payments for the training 
of Ghanaians. These amounts payable by the 
contractor are tax deductible elements. 
 
2.3 Cash Flow Models  
 
The following are the modelled equations based on 
the Deepwater Tano Cape Three Point fiscal terms 
and conditions. These were used to evaluate the 
implications on the end benefits to both the State and 
the contractor. 
 
State’ share is given as shown in Equation 2.1. 
 
𝑆𝑇 = 𝑅𝑜𝑦 + 𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑠 + 𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑠 + 𝐶𝐼𝑇 + 𝐴𝑂𝐸 − 𝑇𝐶𝑔     
     2.1 
Contractor’s share of revenue is given as shown in 
Equation 2.2. 
 
𝐶𝑇 = 𝐶𝑆 − 𝑇𝐶𝑐 − 𝐶𝐼𝑇                             2.2 
and 
𝐶𝐼𝑇 = 𝐶𝑆 − 𝐶𝐴 − 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑐-CLF                    2.3 
 
The basis for achieving AOE levels are given by 
Equations 2.4 to 2.5 
 
𝐹𝐴𝑛 = [FA𝑛−1(1 + (12.5% + 𝑖))] + 𝑁𝐶𝐹  2.4a 
𝑆𝐴𝑛 = [SA𝑛−1(1 + (17.5% + 𝑖))] +
(𝑁𝐶𝐹−𝐴𝑂𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑛 )                                           2.4b 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑛 = [TA𝑛−1(1 + (22.5% + 𝑖))] + [𝑁𝐶𝐹 −
(𝐴𝑂𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑛 + 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑛)]                                 2.4c 
 
𝐴𝑂𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑛 = 10% × 𝐹𝐴𝑛                            2.5a 
 
𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑛 = 12.5% × 𝑆𝐴𝑛                                2.5b 
 
𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑛 = 20% × 𝑇𝐴𝑛                                      2.5c 
 
Achieved AOE within a year is by Equation 2.6 
 
𝐴𝑂𝐸 = 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑛 + 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑛 + 𝐴𝑂𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑛 + ⋯   2.6 
 




                                               2.7 
 
where 
𝐹𝐴𝑛, 𝑆𝐴𝑛, 𝑇𝐴𝑛 respectively represent the first, 
second, third amount within the current year and 
FA𝑛−1, SA𝑛−1, TA𝑛−1 account for amount in the 
previous year.  
Roy = state’s royalty,  
IPIs = State initial participating interest 
IPAs = State additional participating interest 
realised 
CIT= Corporate Income tax 
TCg = State’s share of total petroleum costs 
TCc = contractor’s share of total petroleum costs 
CS= contractor’s share of revenue 
CA = capital allowance of petroleum expenditure 
CLF = cash loss carried forward 
ATNCF = after tax net cash flow 
NPV = project’s net present value 
OPEXc = contractor’s share of OPEX 
“i” = inflation rate 
t = time measured in year 
3 Results and Discussion 
One way to determine if a particular fiscal regime is 
efficient is to plot the NPV of net cash flow from an 
oil field development after government take against 
NPV of the same before government take. The 
flexibility and effectiveness of the fiscal terms is 
normally evaluated at various field sizes and 
different oil price levels. Once the cash flow model 
has been built, the merit of any proposed fiscal terms 
can be evaluated. 
3.1 Take Statistics 
 
Figs. 4 and 5 show the impact of oil field reserves 
on the Take statistics of the State and the contractor 




Fig. 4 Reserves Impact on the State’s Takes at 
Varying Oil Price 
 
 
Fig. 5 Reserves Impact on the Contractor’s Takes 
at Varying Oil Price 
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and contractor’s take is averagely 35% for all field 
sizes scenarios considered at oil price of $60 and $80 
per barrel. This is a fair sharing of economic rents at 
high profitability environments. However, at $40 
per barrel, the State’s take is very high for all oil 
field sizes. This makes the fiscal regime 
inadequately attractive in low profitability 
environments. The high state takes at low price 
conditions is as a result of the fact that the royalty 
and initial participating shares of the revenues is not 
based on the profitability levels of the project. 
 
3.2 Additional Oil Entitlement 
 
How the state achieves additional economic rent as 
boundary conditions of oil price and field size 
change was investigated and illustrated in Fig. 6. It 
is seen that generally State’s AOE increases with 
increasing both field reserves and oil price. This is 
good since AOE of the Ghana’s fiscal regime is 
linked to the project profitability through the 
contractor’s after tax inflation –adjusted ROR. 
Though the fiscal regime fails to recover additional 
oil for the state for all field size cases when oil price 
drops below $40 per barrel even at the contractor’s 
minimum agreed 12.5% rate of return, this fiscal 
term makes the fiscal regime progressive and 
flexible. Thus as the profitability level of the project 
increases the state receives more additional oil 
entailment and vice versa. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Price and Reserves Impacts on the State’s 
AOE  
 
3.3 State and Contractor NPVs 
 
To establish how flexible a fiscal system is, the 
contractor’s NPV is plotted against the project total 
NPV. The general flexibility of the Ghana Cape 
Three Point’s fiscal regime was investigated and 
illustrated in Figs. 7 and 8 at oil price of $ 60 and $ 
80 per barrel of oil respectively. Both Figs. 7 and 8 
show that the contractor’s NPV increases as the field 
reserves increase for $ 60 and $ 80 per barrel of oil 
for all oil reserves cases. One unique thing about the 
NPV plots in Figs. 4 and 5 is that the interval 
between the Stake NPV and Contractor’s NPV is 
seemingly stable with increasing the profitability of 
the projects. This explains further fair distributions 





Fig. 7 Partners’ NPV at 10% against the Field 
Reserves at $ 60/BBL  
 
 
Fig. 8 Partners’ NPV at 10% against the Field 
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3.4 Impact of Field Size and Oil Price Level 
on Contractor’s NPV 
 
The general flexibility of the fiscal system was 
investigated and illustrated in Fig. 9 The 
contractor’s NPV corresponds to increase in the 
field size and product price. The critical aspect of the 
model shows how the project NPV is impacted as 
field size and oil price change. Mostly, oil investors  
are attracted by flexible fiscal systems which are 
applicable in low field size and price boundary 
conditions. From Fig. 9, the investments in all the 
field size cases at oil prices below $30 per barrel will 
produce negative NPV and would render such fields 
marginal at these low oil price environments. This 
normally occurs when some fiscal terms are not 
linked to the profitability levels of the project. 
Generally, flexible fiscal regimes make way for the 
development of fields of any size at varying oil 
prices. Moreover, in the phase of keen competition 
between crude oil consumption and renewable 
energy players, the realisation of high oil price will 
be predictably difficult. Therefore, fiscal regimes 
should be formulated such that they are flexible 
enough to cover these lower boundary conditions for 
faster developments.  
 
 
Fig. 9 Impact of Field Reserves and Oil Price on 
the Contractor’s NPV at 10% 
 
4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
How robust and attractive and whether government 
of Ghana will continue to assess benefits at low price 
level under the Jubilee field fiscal regime have been 
ascertained. This was carried out through discounted 
economic cash flow model based on the fiscal terms.  
The model shows how the project NPV is impacted 
as field size and oil price change. Mostly, oil 
investors are attracted by flexible fiscal systems 
which are applicable in low field size and price 
boundary conditions. It was determined that for all 
field sizes considered at oil prices above $ 30/bbl, 
contractor’s NPVs are positive. The project take 
statistics are averagely around 64% for Government 
and 36% for contractor under the various scenarios 
except for oil prices less than $40/bbl where the 
State’s take statistic is above 80% and contractor’s 
take below 20%. The high State’s takes at low price 
conditions is as a result of the fact that the royalty 
and initial participating shares due to the State are 
not based on the profitability levels of the project. 
The State receives AOE only when the oil price is 
above $40/bbl and the AOE increases steadily with 
the oil price for all the various field sizes. In general, 
the Jubilee field fiscal regime is fairly attractive and 
flexible and ensures stable shares of economic rents 
between the State and the contractor as the 
profitability of the field increases.  
 
In the phase of keen competition between crude oil 
consumption and renewable energy players, the 
realisation of high oil price will be predictably 
difficult. Therefore, the Deep Water Tano fiscal 
regimes should be formulated such that they are 
flexible enough to cover these lower boundary 
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